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As we look over the country today we see two classes of people. The 
excessively rich and the abject poor, and between them is a gulf ever 
deepening, ever widening, and the ranks of the poor are continually being 
recruited from a third class, the well-to-do, which class is rapidly disappearing 
and being absorbed by the very poor. Milford Wriarson Howard (1862-1937), 
in The American Plutocracy, 1895. 
 
This paper argues for important similarities between today’s economic situation and the 
picture painted above by Milford Howard, a member of the US Senate at the time he wrote 
The American Plutocracy. This was the time, the 1880s and 1890s, when a combination of 
Manchester Liberalism – a logical extension of Ricardian economics – and Social Darwinism 
– promoted by the exceedingly influential UK philosopher Herbert Spencer – threatened 
completely to take over economic thought and policy on both sides of the Atlantic.  
 
At the same time, the latter half of the 19th century was marred by financial crises and social 
unrest. The national cycles of boom and bust were not as globally synchronized as they later 
became, but they were frequent both in Europe and in the United States. Activist reformer Ida 
Tarbell probably exaggerated when she recalled that in the US “the eighties dripped with 
blood”, but a growing gulf between a small and opulent group of bankers and industrialists 
produced social unrest and bloody labour struggles. The panic on May 5, 1893 triggered the 
worst financial crisis in the US until then. 
 
In economic theory, this increasing concentration of wealth and power that resulted from 
ostensibly “free market” activities caused a massive upheaval against classical economics in 
the late 19th century. In his three-volume Main Currents in Modern Economics (1971) 2 Ben 
Seligman expressively entitles the first volume, dedicated to this period, “The Revolt against 
Formalism”. This revolt was spearheaded under different labels – historicism, institutionalism, 
empiricism, social policy, religion, socialism, ethics – but all these movements were in 
practice directed against the two-pronged movement of Manchester Liberalism (similar to 
today’s neoliberalism) and Spencerian Darwinism. Ricardian formalism and social Darwinism 
decidedly lost this battle. In the US the 1890s saw the beginning anti-trust legislation and an 
increased awareness to social issues and a social justice which markets alone were obviously 
unable to deliver. Europe saw the growth of what was to become the welfare state, and the 
German Verein für Sozialpolitik (Association for Social Policy) pragmatically and patiently 
leading the way over a period of sixty years. Capitalism was tamed in the sense that 
predatory activities, excessive market power, and speculations were harnessed, while social 
problems were met by new policy institutions.    
 
                                                     
1 This paper is based on discussions in the volume Thorstein Veblen: Economist for an Age of Crises, 
Erik S. Reinert & Francesca Viano (eds.), London: Anthem (The Other Canon Series), 2012 
2 Ben B. Seligman, Main Currents in Modern Economics. Economic Thought since 1870, 3 vols., 
Chicago: Triangle Books, 1971 (a one-volume edition had been published in 1962 by The Free Press). 
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Three economics texts from the late 1890 – by Gustav Schmoller (Germany), Herbert Foxwell 
(UK), and Thorstein Veblen (US) – represent the revolt against formalism and the resulting 
taming of capitalism. Although their styles and agendas were different, they are important 
representatives of the alternative theory that solidified on both sides of the Atlantic during the 
1890s. They created an alternative to what Gustav Schmoller called the irrational twins: 
Manchester Liberalism and communism. This 1890s generation laid the foundations for the 
Middle Way between communism and Manchester liberalism, for a regulated capitalism with 
decent economic distribution and after the 1930s – as long as this theory was kept in place – 
also without major financial crises.  
 
The mainstream canonical account of the history of economic thought has come to 
overshadow the important radical and influential voices of Schmoller, Foxwell, and Veblen 
Instead today’s focus on this period is on the marginalists, a group of economists who chose 
to avoid studying issues with normative and political implications – but therefore also chose 
political irrelevance – and the neoclassical tradition starting with Alfred Marshall’s Principles of 
Economics (1890). With marginalism and Marshall – particularly in the appendices to his 
Principles – economics was to develop into the new and even more sterile formalism. 
However, the revolting group of economists here mentioned helped shaping the incentive 
system of capitalism so that the interests of individual capitalists again were brought in line 
with the interests of society at large.   
 
Starting in 1929, The Great Depression saw a rehash of the social and theoretical conflicts of 
the 1890s, but this time featuring a new generation of economists: Joseph Schumpeter in the 
German speaking and John Maynard Keynes in the English speaking world, both men born in 
1883. However, the foundations of the science of controlling and civilizing industrial capitalism 
– the basic arguments against what today is called neoliberalism – had been laid in the 
preceding generation.     
 
Now history is repeating itself, as usual with variations. Crises, then and now, necessarily 
bring with them a discussion of the role of self-interest and greed in capitalism.3 Greed, or 
avarice, is one of the seven mortal sins of Christendom. However, since capitalism is based 
on self-interest, successful capitalism must separate the kind of self-interest which contributes 
to wealth creation from that which constitutes predatory wealth extraction.4 In other words 
productive self-interest or good greed must be separated from bad greed. Neo-classical 
economics, however, contains no internal arguments against Gordon Gekko’s Greed is Good 
in Oliver Stone’s 1987 movie “Wall Street”. The economics of the 1890s, however, had 
theories which provided the necessary separation, and it is time to re-discover them.   
 
Thorstein Veblen’s work was the one making the clearest separation between the human 
proclivities that produce – respectively – good and bad greed. I shall argue that Veblen re-
invented wisdom and insights that had already been made during the Enlightenment, insights 
that need to be re-discovered. However, just as last time, these insights cannot be re-
discovered without ridding economics of excessive neoclassical formalism which – through its 
                                                     
3 Many books have been published on the subject of greed recently. A historical overview is provided by 
David E.Y Sarna, History of Greed, Financial Fraud from Tulip Mania to Bernie Madoff, Hoboken: Wiley, 
2010. 
4 A discussion of this and a fifty page bibliography on the issue are found in Erik S. Reinert and Arno 
Daastøl, Production Capitalism vs. Financial Capitalism – Symbiosis and Parasitism. An Evolutionary 
Perspective and Bibliography, The Other Canon Foundation and Tallinn University of Technology 
Working Papers in Technology Governance and Economic Dynamics, No 36, 2011. Downloadable on 
http://hum.ttu.ee/tg/   
real-world economics review, issue no. 63 
subscribe for free 
 
59 
 
inability to separate good greed from bad greed – provides dogmas which presently benefit 
wealth extraction at the expense of wealth creation.  
 
 
1890s: three elements in the revolt against formalism 
 
Opposition to an overly formalistic science of economics would focus on three key aspects of 
the economics of David Ricardo (1817) which – if employed in practical policy – will distort 
policies in ways which, contrary to what the same theory claims, often create rents that distort 
the distribution of economic gains. We could call them Ricardo’s three vices:  
 
1. Ricardo’s assumption-based rather than an empirically based theory. The 
belief that one could easily deduce policy conclusions directly from a highly 
abstract theoretical model leads the profession systemically to ignore 
important aspects of reality. This is the original Ricardian Vice as described 
by Schumpeter. Instead economic theory needed to be experience-based: 
built on observations of reality rather than on assumptions taken out of thin 
air. If “perfect competition” is assumed while oligopolies and monopolies are 
a normal state of affairs, policies based on the assumption of “perfect 
competition” will create rents to the companies that operate under oligopolies 
and monopolies.    
2. Ricardo’s built-in defence of colonialism. Establishing the theory of 
international trade on the barter of labour hours, void of any qualitative 
features, Ricardo created an economic theory where all economic activities 
became qualitatively alike: a stone-age technology was implicitly defined as 
equally conducive to economic welfare as industrial age technology. Ricardo 
made colonialism morally defensible.    
3. Ricardo’s failure to distinguish the financial sector from real economy. 
Although he did connect the quantity of money to inflation, Ricardo’s 
economic system failed to distinguish between the monetary (financial) 
sphere of the economy and the real economy of goods and services.5 This 
Ricardian foundation plays an important role in the present crisis. First, it 
makes it impossible to describe an economic world where the financial sector 
takes on a parasitic – rather than a supportive – relationship to the real 
economy of goods and non-financial services. Secondly, as a corollary to 
this, it opens up for the erroneous belief that a rapidly growing financial sector 
at the expense of the real economy is qualitatively no different from the 
growth of the industrial sector at the expense of the agricultural sector. And 
thirdly and more specifically – which is the main point of this paper – this 
Ricardian foundation makes it impossible to distinguish between making 
money in a way that increases the size of the economic pie (good greed) and 
making money in a way that reduces the size of the economic pie (bad 
greed).  
 
The Ricardian vices and their neo-classical equivalents give rise to important economic rents. 
The failure to distinguish qualitatively between economic activities produced an excuse for 
colonialism, and made it possible for colonial powers to extract rents from the Third World. 
The failure to distinguish between the financial sector and the real economy – the failure to 
see that finance may become parasitic – makes it possible today for the financial sector to 
                                                     
5 Ricardo made his fortune in the financial economy, as a stockbroker and loan broker.    
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make huge profits from predation on the real economy. Ironically, mainstream economics 
which on the surface abhors rents – like those created by industrial policies – itself produces 
huge rents to the parasitic elements of capitalism. Formal Ricardian and neo-classical 
economics are in actual fact the rent-seekers’ best friend. The ostensible non-normative and 
non-political mainstream theory as a matter of fact plays an important role as a de-facto ally of 
“the one per cent”: mainstream economics plays the role of useful and well-paid collaborators. 
Just like financial crises, the unproductive rents collected do not exist in theory, they only exist 
in practice.   
      
This paper, then, focuses on the third of these Ricardian vices, the one that is at the root of 
the present crisis of the West. But first a brief note on the three publications by the 
representative rebels of the 1890s: Herbert Foxwell (1849-1936), a Cambridge economist 
who was president of the Royal Economic Society and founded what are probably the two 
best collections of economics book, now at Harvard (Kress Collection) and the University of 
London (Goldsmiths’ Collection). Gustav von Schmoller (1838-1917), Founder of the Verein 
für Sozialpolitik and later Rector of the University of Berlin, and the major US economist of 
this generation: Thorstein Bunde Veblen (1857-1929), the Norwegian-American economist 
who founded both evolutionary and institutional economics.  
 
The first of the three publications is Gustav Schmoller’s 1897 inaugural speech as Rector of 
the University of Berlin, which laments that “the human idealism of Adam Smith” had 
degenerated into “the hard mammonism of the Manchester School”6 (i.e. today’s 
neoliberalism) and where he decries the naiveté of both laissez-faire and communism as 
“twins of an ahistorical rationalism”.7 As already noted Schmoller decried what he called the 
two irrational twins: Manchester Liberalism and communism. Schmoller’s typifies the views of 
the German Historical School, or – as they were called – the socialists of the chair 
(Kathedersozialisten). 
 
The second work of revolt, two years later, is Cambridge economist Herbert Foxwell’s 110-
page introduction to a book by Anton Menger.8 Foxwell also distances himself from both 
political utopias and – very importantly – holds David Ricardo’s work responsible for the 
political ills to both the political right and the political left, i.e. for the ills of both of Schmoller’s 
irrational twins. Foxwell’s criticism of abstract Ricardian theory has a strong punch:  
 
Ricardo, and still more those who popularised him, may stand as an example 
for all time of the extreme danger which may arise from the unscientific use of 
hypothesis and social speculations, from the failure to appreciate the limited 
application to actual affairs of highly artificial and arbitrary analysis.9  
 
Thorstein Veblen’s The Theory of the Leisure Class is a third element in this theoretical revolt 
of the late 1890s. It was published in the same year Foxwell published his anti-Ricardian 
treaty. Both Schmoller and Foxwell were, not surprisingly, favourably referred to by Veblen.10  
                                                     
6 On the Manchester School, see William D. Grampp, The Manchester School of Economics, Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1960.  
7 Gustav Schmoller, Wechslende Theorien und faststehende Wahrheiten im Gebiete der Staats- und 
Socialwissenschaften und die heutige deutsche Volkswirtschaftslehre, Berlin: W. Büxenstein, 1897; 
online: www.othercanon.org 
8 Herbert Foxwell, introduction to Anton Menger, The Right to the whole Produce of Labour, London: 
Macmillan, 1899. Online: www.othercanon.org  
9 Foxwell, op.cit, p. xli. 
10 Thorstein Veblen, “Review: Gustav Schmoller, Über einige Grundfragen der Socialpolitik und der 
Volkswirtschaftslehre”, Journal of Political Economy 6.3. (June 1898), 416–19. Foxwell’s introduction to 
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When Veblen mocks Ricardian context-free and overly formalistic economics, he is 
essentially making the same point as Foxwell, but he uses a very different style:  
 
A gang of Aleutian Islanders slashing about in the wrack and surf with rakes 
and magical incantations for the capture of shell-fish are held, in point of 
taxonomic reality, to be engaged in a feat of hedonistic equilibration in rent, 
wages, and interest.11 
 
What was to become the new mainstream was also clearly influenced by the changing 
paradigm of the 1890s, towards a less abstract and more dynamic type of economics. When 
Alfred Marshall lists his influences in the introduction to his Principles of Economics (1890), 
he does not mention Smith and Ricardo. The two kinds of influences that have affected the 
book “more than any other”, says Marshall in the introduction to his magnum opus, are those 
of biology, as represented by the writings of Herbert Spencer, and “of history and philosophy, 
as represented by Hegel’s Philosophy of History”.12 These were aspects later lost by 
Marshall’s neoclassical successors: the theory was more than ever before elevated into highly 
prestigious but sadly irrelevant levels of abstraction.     
 
 
The enlightenment discovery and taming of private interest – from Bernard Mandeville 
to Pietro Verri.    
 
The writings of Bernard Mandeville (1670-1733) came as a shock to early 18th century 
Europe. His book The Fable of the Bees; or Private Vices, Publick Benefits (1724)13 – of 
which a first volume was published in 1714 – opened up for individual self-interest as a main 
engine of growth inside an economic system of laissez-faire. Mandeville could be interpreted 
as claiming all greed is good greed. The ensuing events and debates in Europe – essentially 
lasting through the rest of the century – fine-tuned the limits of this laissez-faire, gradually 
leading to a system which in practice lined up the incentives for the private sector to coincide 
with what was in the interest of society at large: private interest was let free only where it 
coincided with the public interests. Private interest which was in conflict with the public 
interest was what I for short have labelled bad greed, and institutions and legislation were 
created in order to prevent such activities.    
 
At the time Mandeville was accused of heresy, being a “zealot of infidelity”, of “subverting 
order and discipline in the Church” and of “recommending luxury, avarice, pride and all kind of 
vices as being necessary to public welfare”. Nevertheless, as the 18th century progressed, 
Mandeville’s basic message of the importance of self-interest came to be recognized. His 
message was simplified by an example provided by Adam Smith: It is not through the 
kindness of the baker that we get our daily bread, it is because the baker needs to make 
money.  
 
The effect of Bernard Mandeville’s The Fable of the Bees was like that of a torch to a pile of 
dry wood. Mandeville’s claims that “private vices could become public virtues” – indeed the 
whole basis for Adam Smith and today’s mainstream – went totally against the previous idea 
of a society constructed on virtue, on the virtù of the Renaissance civic humanism. In 1757 
                                                                                                                                                        
Menger is referred to by Veblen as “Menger’s admirable introduction” in Essential Writings of Thorstein 
Veblen, eds. Charles Camic and Geoffrey M. Hodgson, London: Routledge, 2011, p. 375. 
11 Thorstein Veblen, The Place of Science in Modern Civilization, New York: Huebsch, 1919, p. 193.  
12 Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics, London: Macmillan, 1890.  
13 Bernard Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees; or, Private Vices Public Benefits, London: T. Ostell, 1806.   
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Erik Pontoppidan – Rector of the University of Copenhagen and the editor of Denmark-
Norway’s first economic journal – provides an example of the attempts at drawing 
demarcation lines in Mandeville’s work between the self-interest which promotes the common 
weal and that which destroys the common weal:      
 
I know how an English author of the work The Fable of the Bees can argue 
for lasciviousness and luxury: that it creates labour for many hands. This can 
apply to policy when foreigners buy more of the work than we do ourselves, 
when the raw materials are our own, and when the hands of our labourers 
are more than those who can be employed at the plough, at the flail14, and at 
the oars. I also know what has been replied to this writer, with good reason, 
that if his suggestions had been well founded, it would follow that a group of 
arsonists, to whom it occurred to set fire to all four corners of London, ought 
to be seen as the best of patriots, because they, more than anyone else, 
would do much for the trade and employment of many thousands of masons, 
carpenters and other artisans in the reconstruction of the town.15  
 
The debate on luxury was a central to the Enlightenment, requiring a limitation similar to that 
between good and bad greed. Pontoppidan hints at the answer: luxury became accepted as 
long as it adds value to local raw materials and/or employs idle hands, and as long as it does 
not worsen the balance of payment. We must keep in mind that most nations at the time were 
far from the production-possibility frontier, had much underemployment, and balance of 
payment problems.          
 
As the 18th century grew older, the fine-tuning of the limits of private interests – of greed – 
advanced. In his main work of 1771, Count Pietro Verri of Milan succinctly condensed the 
limits to Mandevilles’s theory in one brief sentence:    
 
Because the private interest of each individual, when it coincides with the 
public interests, is always the safest guarantor of public happiness.16  
 
Any and all greed and self-interest is obviously not compatible with public interest, only the 
self-interest which increases rather than diminishes the size of the economic pie. This would 
be the good self-interest or greed. Today the financial sector shows us that it is as easy to 
make money ruining a country as by building it up, which would obviously be bad greed, one 
that does not coincide with the public interest. But since economic theory has lost society as 
an economic category – a fact famously restated by Margaret Thatcher – it has not been 
noticed that the same theory has lost the middle part of Verri’s sentence: self-interest and 
greed is only good when it coincides with the public interest. In this way neo-classical 
economics has opened up for a Gordon Gekko-like theory where all greed is good. 
 
What we could call Verri’s Rule distinguishes the good greed which is in the public interest 
from the bad greed which is a predatory greed not in the public interest. Verri’s Rule is 
reasonably clear, but not necessarily clear-cut in all applications. The kind of self-interests 
which produces innovations and goods and services increasing the size of the economic pie 
for all is a good kind of “greed”. Henry Ford, for example, made money in a way which 
                                                     
14 Instrument used for threshing grain. 
15 Danmark og Norges Oeconomiske Magazin, Preface to Vol. 1, 1757. 
16 Pietro Verri, Meditazioni sulla economia politica, Genova: Ivone Gravier, 1771, p. 42, emphasis 
added.  
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revolutionized transportation and increased the size of the economic pie. The same positive 
effects for society cannot be found when George Soros brought down the British pound. 
Markets need arbitration which, it can be argued, is in the public interest. But actively inducing 
huge devaluations and speculative gains is something different from arbitration.  
 
If we attempt to employ Verri’s Rule to the 2012 election debate around Mitt Romney’s 
economic activities in Bain Capital, this company’s activities probably come out on both sides, 
both as good and bad greed. Leveraged buyouts may put troubled companies in working 
order, but these processes seem easily to degenerate into asset stripping and the overseas 
outsourcing of jobs, which – applying Verri’s Rule – would be bad greed. Verri’s Rule is clear 
and simple, and in my view useful, but of course not free of grey areas.      
 
Pietro Verri’s 1771 work shows that continental European economists had accepted and 
clarified Mandeville’s basic message before Adam Smith, who is the one who tends to get the 
credit for this.       
 
 
The French Revolution: an overdose of economic freedom leading to predatory greed 
  
Standard textbook economics normally traces its roots back to the times of feudalism, to the 
tradition of the French Physiocrats. The Physiocrats defined wealth as consisting only of the 
produce of agriculture; industry and services were deemed as “sterile” (after all we live only 
from food, right?). The emphasis of the Physiocrats on freedom of trade led to a situation we 
recognize today: much more money can be made through speculation in rising prices of items 
already produced (be it real estate, stocks, or food) than from producing new goods and 
services. Under the rule of Physiocracy in France more money could be made by taking 
wheat and flour out of Paris waiting for prices to rise, than from supplying bread to the 
inhabitants of Paris.17 The good greed described in Adam Smith’s example of the baker was 
crowded out by the bad greed of speculation. Freedom to speculate came into conflict with 
the freedom from hunger. 
 
The excesses of the Physiocratic doctrine that dominated in France from the 1750s provided 
an important antidote to any extreme interpretation of Mandevillian freedoms. With the events 
leading up to the French Revolution, it became evident that some economic actors’ freedoms 
to needed to be limited by other economic actors’ freedoms from. Freedom of trade also 
brought with it the freedom to speculate, and this led to shortages of bread in Paris.  
 
At the time the authorities, through their ideological beliefs, argued that – by definition – 
unlimited economic freedom would produce economic harmony. As one journal serenely put it 
in 1765: “The riots are not and cannot be the effect of real need because in a regime of liberty 
the dearth that the enraged minds fear, or feign to fear, is manifestly impossible”.18 In other 
words, if people are hungry, it must be something they imagine, because a system of freedom 
is automatically seen also to be a system of harmony. The models had become more real 
than reality itself, reflecting Ricardo’s later view that if their doctrines don’t tally with the facts 
that is just “so much worse for the facts”19. The parallels to today’s economic theory should be 
reasonably clear.   
                                                     
17 For a discussion, see Steven L. Kaplan, Bread, Politics, and Political Economy in the Reign of Louis 
XV, 2nd edition, London: Anthem (The Other Canon Series), forthcoming 2013, p. 201.    
18  Kaplan, op cit, p. 201.    
19 John M. Ferguson, Landmarks of Economic Thought, New York: Longmans, 
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In spite of its theoretical impossibility, the speculation-induced scarcity of bread was real. In 
fact the economic debates of the day – between the Physiocrats who believed in unlimited 
economic freedom vs. the Anti-Physiocrats who believed capitalism needed regulation – is in 
a sense the prototype of an economic debate. The historical fact is that the Physiocrats lost 
all the battles, except the one in today’s textbooks in economics: a standard history of 
economics starts with a mention of the Physiocrats as a preamble to the introduction of Adam 
Smith. In this sense, neo-classical economics is fictitious to its very roots: it proudly bases 
itself on a theory that lost all battles in practical economic policy. Indeed, the French 
Revolution broke out in 1789 on the day when news reached Paris that the last Anti-
Physiocrat – Jacques Necker – had lost his job as French Minister of Finance.20  
 
The political base of Physiocracy was found in the feudal landowners who benefitted from 
speculation, just as today’s political basis of neoliberalism represents the same type of 
speculative interests. Today – without a gold standard and with an ability to create money out 
of thin air – the supporters of the “freedom to make money from speculation rather than from 
production” no longer rest with the feudal landlords, but with the financial sector. The same 
financial sector which today benefits greatly from an economic theory unable to distinguish 
the financial sector from the real economy. There is, then, an important qualitative difference 
between making money from the production of goods and services and profiting from 
changing prices for what has already been produced: between wealth creation and wealth 
extraction.       
 
 
Thorstein Veblen’s understanding of capitalism 
 
What are the defining characteristics of this capitalism which some – including myself – claim 
needs to be re-civilized? First of all, compared to earlier economic systems, capitalism is 
characterized by Polanyi’s three fictitious commodities which had not been objects of 
purchase in previous economic systems: land, labour, and money.   
 
Secondly, Werner Sombart adds to our understanding of the capitalist system when he 
defines its origins as the point where activities no longer ceased at the point when the 
immediate economic needs of the family had been met. Another characteristic of capitalism 
is, then, the scale of production and a large division of labour. Historically, capitalism was 
born in the Italian city states of the Renaissance in the spirit of magna facere, of doing great 
things, as in Lorenzo il Magnifico’s Florence. Sombart also defines the institutional structure 
of capitalism as consisting of 1) the entrepreneur, 2) the modern state, and 3) the industrial 
system. This is a definition that also fits capitalism in the early Italian city states.  
 
Leonardo da Vinci (1452-1519) – a prolific artist, engineer and inventor – is the prototype 
character at the birth of capitalism. But can his motivation only have been greed? A new 
motivation at the time of Leonardo was a religious gestalt-switch which took place under 
influence from the Eastern Church. Human beings were created in the image of God, and 
should therefore attempt to create as He had. Invention and innovation became a religious 
                                                                                                                                                        
Green & Co. 1938, p. 142. 
20 Kaplan, op. cit.  
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duty.21 Innovations – once a synonym for heresy for which Roger Bacon was punished in the 
13th century – after the Renaissance became a goal for society, as in Francis Bacon’s Of 
Innovations (1625). 
 
Thorstein Veblen contributed to our understanding of capitalism by deconstructing the 
simplistic idea of self-interest into several facets, in a way compatible with its historical origins. 
In his Theory of the Leisure Class (1899), Veblen produced a classification of the spirits of 
capitalism which helps us understand the problems of today. While English economic theory 
in the tradition of Jeremy Bentham had constructed a passive homo economicus, a creature 
seeking pleasure and avoiding pain, Veblen – in the spirit of the Renaissance – thought that 
activity and initiative, not passivity, was the economic essence of Mankind. While other 
animals harvested, the essence of Man’s economic activity was to Veblen production, not – 
as Adam Smith had claimed – barter. 
 
To Veblen, society needed to be understood in its evolution over time, not in terms of statics 
or comparative statics. He saw this evolution being driven by human instincts and proclivities.  
On the productive side we have:   
 
1) The instinct of workmanship, the desire to produce,  
2) The parental bent, that human beings react to the fact that they are part 
of a larger society, 
3) Idle curiosity, the not-for-profit desire to understand and therefore, in a 
positive sense, to control the world around us. 
4) The instinct of emulation, of copying others with the intention of 
improving, be it in production, i.e. in technological development, or in 
consumption patterns, i.e. in conspicuous consumption.  
 
These instincts were complemented by an instinct of predation – of bad greed – a desire to 
get something for nothing, to harvest where others have sown. Veblen’s criticism of the 
predation instinct and the “vested interests” and their profit created from unproductive 
activities recall previous religious calls against usury. Usury was seen as an immoral act in 
which gold and silver received profits without having done any constructive work. Inanimate 
objects like gold and silver should not be allowed to procreate. 
 
But Veblen was not a religious man, and his criticism did not confront the financial sector as 
such. Rather he attempted to separate capitalism into two distinct spheres of interest, those 
motivated by the instinct of workmanship and the other productive instincts (the engineers) 
making money from production, and the businessmen whose pecuniary gains came from 
predatory activities. Schumpeter’s view of what motivates businessmen is in the spirit of the 
Renaissance and of Veblen, including his view that a motivation for early industrialists was to 
emulate the life-style of the feudal landlords.  
 
Personally, as did at least one of Veblen’s most influential students, I find it difficult to 
distinguish between engineers and businessmen in practical life. However, this does not 
mean that the distinction is not extremely useful, just that the demarcation line should 
probably be drawn elsewhere. At the root of today’s financial crisis is a Veblenian mechanism 
of “vested interest”, the desire of the financial sector to get something from nothing. First of all 
                                                     
21 Erik S. Reinert and Arno Daastøl, “Exploring the Genesis of Economic Innovations: The religious 
gestalt-switch and the duty to invent as preconditions for economic growth”, European Journal of Law 
and Economics, Vol. 4, No. 2/3, 1997, pp. 233-283. 
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from speculative activities, from changing prices of goods which have already been produced, 
rather than from the production of new goods and services. The line between legitimate 
hedging of positions in the real economy and generating speculative bubbles may not be 
crystal clear, but it is there. Secondly, from the financial sector’s ability to create money and 
liquidity far exceeding the ability of the real economy to invest this liquidity in a profitable way, 
thus creating unpayable debts. The excess liquidity created will accumulate as assets in the 
financial sector, and as liabilities in the real economy.  
 
In practice central banks have not only been printing money, they have simultaneously been 
printing debt, the predatory collection of which represents an extreme case of bad greed. 
Greece was the first country to be driven into poverty by this mechanism. Bankruptcy and 
default has always been crucial elements in capitalism, and European nations must now be 
allowed to default like Latin American countries frequently have for over a century.       
    
Capitalism may function well when the interest of the capitalist class is in line with the 
interests of society at large. When capitalists make money on new technology and production 
(based on Veblen’s instinct of workmanship), they make money through good greed that 
automatically increases the size of the economic pie and therefore contributes to the common 
weal. A major achievement of Enlightenment economics, on which I argue Veblen builds, was 
to separate the economic activities where the vested interests contributed to the common 
good – where wealth-production was a by-product of self-interest and greed – and where 
greed produced no such beneficial effects.  
 
In certain periods – those not dominated by Manchester liberalism or neoliberalism – it has 
been obvious that private interests – greed - were not always in perfect harmony in a market 
economy. The role of the legislator was seen as creating the policies that made sure 
individual interests coincided with the public ones. The role of the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act 
had precisely been to enforce this Enlightenment vision of the economy, to make sure that the 
interests which the financial sector could legally pursue stayed in line with the interests of 
society at large. As it now is, after the Glass-Steagall Act was abolished, heaps of money can 
be made by destroying economies – as we see in Greece – rather than by building them.  
 
It is normal that capital floods to the newest and most profitable industries that display the 
highest rate of technical change and growth, be it Carnegie’s steel mills, Ford’s assembly 
lines or Bill Gates and his Microsoft. Capitalism collapses, on the other hand, when money 
flows to the financial sector per se, as if finance were an industry on par with steel, cars, or 
software. Thus, the fundamental flaw behind today’s global situation is the failure to 
distinguish sufficiently between the real economy and the financial economy (see Fig. 1 
below). This clear distinction was once understood – not only in Islamic economics as today – 
but all along the political axis from Marx and Lenin on the left, to social democrat Rudolf 
Hilferding – a Jew who was killed by the Gestapo – to the conservatives Schumpeter and 
Keynes, all the way to Hitler’s economists on the far right. The German distinction between 
schaffendes Kapital (creative capital) and raffendes Kapital (roughly: capital which grabs 
existing wealth) is a useful parallel to good and bad greed, but unfortunately it was created by 
persons too close to fascism.  
 
As Karl Polanyi points out, what communism, fascism and the New Deal had in common was 
a distrust of laissez faire. This included an understanding of the need to control the financial 
sector. Of the three ideologies that aimed at controlling the financial sector, it should be pretty 
obvious which one to choose: we need to recreate policies in the spirit of the New Deal. In a 
real-world economics review, issue no. 63 
subscribe for free 
 
67 
 
sense the West – and Europe in particular – has not faced the task of a necessary clean-up of 
its ideological chamber of horrors from the 1930s as these ideologies related to the 
relationship between the financial sector and the real economy. For decades a separation of 
the financial sector – a mere mention of Hochfinanz or High Finance – risked being labelled 
as anti-Semitic, while it could just as well have been labelled communist or Rooseveltian. The 
political incorrectness that has surrounded the discussion of high finance is one reason why 
financial crises – once understood along the whole political spectrum – are so poorly 
understood today. In a strange way, the horrors of Holocaust have acted to deter and delay 
our understanding of the role played by the financial sector today.    
  
A necessary ingredient in today’s economic drama is also how the way in which economics 
was mathematized has contributed to the increasing dominance of Wall Street over the 
productive sectors. A failure to distinguish the financial economy other than as a mirror image 
of the real economy has made it impossible to formalize key basic insights about the role of 
the financial sector. Such insights only come with any analysis made from a book-keeping 
point of view – e.g. though approaches like those of Hyman Minsky – where it becomes 
obvious that the growth of assets in the financial sector will tend to accumulate as liabilities in 
the balance sheet of the real economy. If excessive debts are not cancelled, the real 
economy enters into a situation of debt peonage to the financial sector.22   
 
The transfer of income and assets from the real economy to the financial economy is the most 
important long-term effect of the bad greed that is allowed to operate in this financial crisis. If 
these imbalances are not addressed by making big investments in the real economy, any 
recovery – however weak – will be driven by demand from the financial sector, and the losses 
in the real economy of the West may be permanent. This is now what is happening in the US 
and in Europe.  
 
Financial crises are basically produced by a mismatch between the real sector of the 
economy and the financial sector, illustrated below.  
 
                                                     
22 For a discussion see my “Mechanisms of Financial Crises in Growth and Collapse: Hammurabi, 
Schumpeter, Perez, and Minsky”, in Jornal Ekonomi Malaysia, No. 46 (1) (2012), pp. 85-100, and The 
Other Canon Foundation and Tallinn University of Technology Working Papers in Technology 
Governance and Economic Dynamics, No 39, 2012. Downloadable on http://hum.ttu.ee/tg/ 
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Figure 1. The real economy vs. the financial economy        
 
 
Understanding financial crises requires a terminology that distinguishes the financial economy 
from the real economy. The financial economy consists of what Schumpeter called 
Rechenpfennige, or accounting units. In Veblen’s terminology, this is the sector that bases its 
activities on pecuniary gain. The real economy consists of the production of goods and 
services, Schumpeter’s Güterwelt, populated by people who in Veblen’s terminology are 
engaged in material production based on the instinct of workmanship and a parental bend (an 
understanding of being part of society), including, of course, the engineers.  
 
In times when capitalism functions well, the financial sector and the real economy live in a 
kind of symbiosis; they support each other. The financial sector functions as scaffolding to the 
real economy or, as Keynes put it, as a “bridge in time”. During times of crisis the financial 
sector takes on a speculative life of its own and becomes a parasite weakening the real 
economy. As the speculative bubble grows, what was once rational (investing in new 
technology) gradually becomes irrational (investing in pyramid games)23. The right hand circle 
in Fig. 1 grows as a malignant tumour and feeds on the real economy in a parasitic way, 
decreasing wages and shrinking whole economies, as Greece experiences at the moment. 
 
But bad greed can also exist inside the real economy. As Veblen argued, sabotage is 
sometimes part and parcel of business strategy. Reading Veblen on this in the 1970s 
sounded like a strange proposition, but when it was proven that ENRON had sabotaged the 
California electricity supply in early 2001 in order to have a price hike approved it became 
obvious that Veblen had been right. This was sabotage and bad greed. Indeed it seems that 
capitalism alternates between periods of relative virtue – as the decades following WW II – 
and periods of frontier capitalism, when all tricks are allowed, as during the 1890s and  
again now.     
 
                                                     
23 That is, irrational from the point of view of society, but still rational to the individual speculator as long 
as the bad greed incentive system is in place.   
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The 1940 movie Edison - The Man – starring Spencer Tracy – gives us the story of how 
Thomas Edison (1847-1931) and his light bulb was sabotaged by the operators of gas lights 
for street lightening. But later Edison himself stood in the way of technological progress. 
Having invested heavily in direct current (DC) Edison fought the superior technology of 
alternating current (AC) pioneered by his former employee Nikola Tesla (1856-1943). AC is 
what we now use because of its high voltage and ability to be transported long distances. 
 
Thorstein Veblen’s term vested interests describes a financial stake in a particular outcome. 
The young inventor Edison fought for his light-bulb against the vested interests of the 
businessmen who owned the gas light operations. Later, when Edison himself had become a 
businessman, he fought even more vigorously than the gas light people had against a new 
and better technology: the alternating current of Nikola Tesla. In other words, engineers have 
vested interests – promoting innovations – which differ from those of businessmen – the 
protection of their vested interests. Adding to Veblen’s terminology, engineers represent good 
greed and business represents bad greed.  
 
During his lifetime Thomas Alva Edison, then, played both sides –representing both good and 
bad greed – in the evolution of electricity. The young and old Edison represent the two 
different forces – the hero and the villain / good and bad greed respectively – in the history of 
electric energy, in what was called “War of the Currents”.  
 
Presently a similar fight is taking place in the US energy sector. A massive campaign is 
organized against subsidies for renewable energy by people with vested interests in old 
technology, particularly coal. The conflict peaked with the so-called Solyndra Scandal. 
Solyndra was a company founded in California in 2005 in order to produce solar panels, and it 
received a Federal Loan of 535 million dollars. This money was lost, and caused a huge 
scandal in the US, helped by a six million dollar ad campaign from the Koch Brothers to blow 
the loss totally out of proportion. A sober look at the situation reveals that the amount lost 
corresponds to 6.7 hours, or 0.28 days, of the annual US defense budget. This is not a large 
amount of money to invest in creating a steeper learning curve for clean energy. Bad greed – 
interested in prolonging the life of polluting technologies – sabotages good greed wanting to 
make money on clean energy. If we re-introduce the public interest as an economic category, 
it makes sense to distinguish good greed from bad greed.  
 
Thorstein Veblen generalized this conflict between businessmen and engineers by saying that 
human society would always involve conflict between existing norms with vested interests, 
and new norms developed out of an innate human tendency to discover and invent, based on 
improving our understanding of the physical world in which we exist. “Idle curiosity” and “the 
instinct of workmanship” are positive proclivities of man (leading to good greed businesses) 
that continuously would be fighting the pecuniary interests of those with a vested interest in 
status quo (bad greed businesses).    
 
 
1989: how the death of one of the irrational twins brought forth the monster in the other 
 
The same worry of a disappearing middle class expressed in the 1895 book which heads this 
paper e had already been voiced by Gustav Schmoller when – at the 1872 founding meeting 
of the Verein für Sozialpolitik – he feared that “society was becoming like a ladder where all 
the middle steps have disappeared. There is only hold at the very top and at the bottom”. 
During the same meeting, Schmoller shows that the arguments at the time were similar to 
real-world economics review, issue no. 63 
subscribe for free 
 
70 
 
those which used to be voiced by the Physiocrats and again by today’s neoliberals: if we just 
get the last vestiges of control out of the way and let the market rule alone, harmony will be 
established.  
 
The deep cleavage in our society separating entrepreneurs and workers, 
owning and not owning classes, represents a threat of a social revolution. 
This threat has drawn closer. In wide circles there have been serious doubts 
whether the economic doctrines which dominate on today’s market – and 
which were expressed at the Economic Congress – forever will keep their 
dominance. Will the introduction of the free right to carry on business 
(Gewerbefreiheit) and the elimination of all mediaeval legislation on guilds 
really crate the perfect economic conditions that the hotheads (Heißsporne) 
of that tradition predict? 24 
 
Instead of the market mechanism creating harmony, then as now we are increasingly 
experiencing what I have labelled post-industrial feudalism, a society economically controlled 
by a small per cent of the population (“the one per cent”) based on the control of a key factor 
of production. Today this is based on the control of capital rather than – as in classical 
feudalism – on the control of land.  
 
As we have seen, in 1897 Schmoller – then Rector at the University of Berlin – had decried 
both Manchester Liberalism, today’s neoliberalism, and communism as “twins of an 
ahistorical rationalism”. When the demise of communism, represented by the 1989 fall of the 
Berlin Wall, marked the death of one of these two ahistorical twins, one could have expected 
that experience-based rationalism – what Schmoller, Foxwell, and Veblen had stood for – 
could declare a resounding victory. That did not happen. 
 
In fact the exact opposite happened. The fall of the Berlin Wall was followed by an 
unprecedented triumphalism of the other irrational twin: of a belief that unfettered markets 
would create economic harmony and even represent “the end of history”. In the 1990s, the 
forces that the Revolt of the 1890s had managed to stop – almost fact-free and static 
economics coupled with social Darwinism in the tradition of Herbert Spencer – virtually 
became the only game in town.    
 
For all its irrationality, for more than one hundred years communism had provided both a 
benchmarking tool and a credible threat that civilized and humanized capitalist economies. A 
Galbraithian balance of countervailing powers – big business, big labour, and big government 
– had created generalized welfare in the West, on both sides of the Atlantic. Now – in the 
name of the market – big labour and big government were dismantled. Checks and balances, 
once so cherished in the United States, were to a large extent gone.  
 
Also in the US post-WW II interest in human rights had to some extent turned to something 
resembling a war against these same rights, now relabelled as entitlements. In his infamous 
47 per cent speech, Mitt Romney singled out those “who believe that government has a 
responsibility to care for them, who believe that they are entitled to health care, to food, to 
housing, to you name it. That that's an entitlement.” At the same time the United Nations’ 
Rapporteur for the Right to Food, Olivier De Schutter, continues to work according to the 
principle that food is a human right.   
                                                     
24 Verein für Socialpolitik, Verhandlungen der Eisenacher Versammlung zur Besprechung der Socialen 
Frage am 6. und 7. October 1872. Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1873, p. 5.   
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Again, the Ricardian blind spots of economic theory were used for rent-seeking in an 
unprecedented way. Monopolies were privatized in the name of “competition” and “free 
markets”. Assumptions of “perfect competition” in economic models blinded people to a reality 
of massive accumulation of market power, and a failure to distinguish the financial economy 
from the real economy sheltered a predatory financial sector from scrutiny by mainstream 
economics and therefore also from politicians. As the irrelevant assumptions of neo-classical 
economics increasingly came to pass for reality itself, massive assumption-based rents could 
be harvested though bad greed: self-interest which does not increase the size of the 
economic pie.  
 
As with the situation leading up to the French Revolution, it is reasonably clear that the 
present crisis is a result of excessive freedom. The freedom of trade so cherished by the 
Physiocrats and their landowning benefactors made it more profitable to move grain and flour 
out of Paris in order to wait for prices to go up, than to bake bread for the citizens of Paris. 
The result was a shortage of bread which was the main cause of the French Revolution.    
  
Today the financial sector enjoys the freedom to create virtually as much money as it wishes, 
freedom to loan the money to the nations and the individuals it wishes, and freedom to send 
the bill to nation-states and their tax-payers when debtors do not pay. Like in pre-
revolutionary Paris, more money is made from speculative activities that do not increase the 
size of the pie – from bad greed – than from the production of goods and services, emanating 
from Veblenian proclivities: the instinct of workmanship and from the idle curiosity of which 
any innovation has an important element. Profit-making is normally a necessary element in 
the production of goods and services in a market economy, but by reducing human motivation 
to a hedonistic activity neo-classical economics fails to distinguish between good and bad 
versions of profit-making and greed.         
  
As the West now faces multiple crises, the most immediately serious one is financial 
predation which rapidly shrinks the real economies in the European periphery. Italy and Spain 
are on track to become the next Greece. The medicine applied to satisfy the financial sector – 
i.e. austerity – in practice amounts to an attempt to massively reduce purchasing power, 
which sends the real economy into a cumulative spiral of decreasing wages, decreasing tax 
income, decreasing investments and – as a result of the falling cost of labour – decreasing 
incentives for labour-saving innovations. I find myself agreeing with Michael Hudson25 that the 
only solution to the present problems of the West is some form of debt cancellation: the huge 
and unpayable debts – their own assets – that the financial sector has been allowed to create 
out of thin air must also be allowed to disappear into thin air.    
 
At the moment bad greed – greed which decreases the size of the real economy – dominates 
in the West, further weakening its economic position vis-à-vis Asia. Just as it was first done 
during the Enlightenment, and later in the 1890s by Thorstein Veblen and his contemporaries, 
“greed” which leads to innovation and increased productivity again needs to be separated 
from predatory greed which, rather than create value, extracts value from national economies.             
As already mentioned, in his 1897 speech Gustav Schmoller lamented that “the human 
idealism of Adam Smith” had degenerated into “the hard mammonism of the Manchester 
School”26. The revolt of the 1890s reversed this trend and civilized capitalism. But now the 
                                                     
25 Michael Hudson, The Bubble and Beyond. Fictitious Capital, Debt Deflation and Global Crisis, 
Dresden: ISLET, 2012.   
26 Gustav Schmoller, 1897, op. cit, online: www.othercanon.org 
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same thing has happened again: humanism has been converted into neoliberal mammonism. 
This can be reversed again, but only by recreating the large diversity of economic approaches 
of the 1890s: historical, evolutionary, institutional, and ethical.   
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